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E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, NATO, MNUC, NPG

SUBJECT: NPG-DRAFT PERMREPS REPORT ON THE FOLLOW-ON USE WORK PROGRAM

REF: A. USNATO 2042

B. STATE 86380

BEGIN SUMMARY.

MISSION PROVIDES IN PARA 3 BELOW TEXT OF REVISED DRAFT OF NPG PERMREPS REPORT ON THE FOLLOW-ON USE WORK PROGRAM WHICH THE IS PREPARED AS A RESULT OF NPG STAFF GROUP (SG) DISCUSSIONS ON APRIL 11 (REF A). SG NOW PLANS TO DISCUSS THE REVISED DRAFT ON MAY 2. WE REVIEWED THE DRAFT WITH MGEN MCAULIFFE DURING HIS RECENT VISIT, AND HIS COMMENTS, COUPLED WITH EARLIER WASHINGTON GUIDANCE IN REF B, WILL PROVIDE SUFFICIENT BASIS FOR US REP TO DISCUSS THE PAPER IN THE STAFF GROUP. WE WOULD, OF COURSE, WELCOME ANY ADDITIONAL COMMENTS (APART FROM GUIDANCE REQUESTED IN PARA 2 BELOW) ON THE TEXT OF THE DRAFT THAT WASHINGTON MAY WISH TO PROVIDE PRIOR TO MAY 2. END SUMMARY.

1. AT THE APRIL 25 NPG STAFF GROUP MEETING (REPORTED SEPTTEL),
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UK AND CANADIAN REPS SAID THEIR AUTHORITIES BELIEVE THAT THE PERMREPS REPORT, IN SECTION IV ON THE SUBJECT OF THE INITIATION OF PHASE III (PREPARATION OF POLITICAL GUIDELINES FOR FOLLOW-ON USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS), SHOULD PROVIDE RECOMMENDATIONS TO

MINISTERS ON THE GENERAL APPROACH THAT MIGHT BE TAKEN. BOTH REPS SAID THAT THEIR AUTHORITIES FAVOR THE THIRD OPTION (PREPARATION OF AN OVERALL CONCEPT FOR THE USE OF THEATER NUCLEAR WEAPONS), AND THAT THEY HOPED OTHER SG MEMBERS COULD INDICATE THEIR AUTHORITIES' VIEWS AT THE MAY 2 SG MEETING, BOTH ON THE PREFERRED APPROACH TO PHASE III AND THE POSSIBILITY OF PROVIDING A SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATION TO MINISTERS IN JUNE. UK REP ALSO SAID THAT HIS AUTHORITIES SUGGEST REFORMULATING TEXT OF THE THIRD OPTION ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES: BEGIN QUOTE. TAKING ACCOUNT OF ONGOING NPG WORK (TECHNOLOGY STUDY, NUNN AMENDMENT FOLLOW-UP, MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE), AND OF NATO'S THEATER NUCLEAR CAPABILITY (AS DESCRIBED IN THE YCEUR REPORT, AND THE DOD REPORT ADDRESSED TO THE NUNN AMENDMENT, DRAW TOGETHER IN ONE PAPER THE CONCLUDED GUIDANCE CONTAINED IN THE BASIC POLICY DOCUMENTS ON THE SUBJECT OF TACTICAL USE DEVELOPED BY THE NPG OVER THE PAST FIVE YEARS. THIS WOULD BE A CONSOLIDATED STATEMENT OF NATO'S CONCEPT FOR THE USE OF THEATER NUCLEAR WEAPONS. IT WOULD NOT SUPERSEDE THE PROVISIONAL POLITICAL GUIDELINES FOR INITIAL USE (PPG), ALTHOUGH WHEN IT WAS COMPLETED IT MIGHT SHOW WHERE THE PPG SHOULD BE EXPANDED TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF FOLLOW-ON USE. END QUOTE.

2. MISSION COMMENT: THE TEXT OF SECTION IV OF THE DRAFT IN PARA 3 BELOW TAKES A NEUTRAL POSITION AS TO HOW TO PROCEED WITH "PHASE III", AND ENDS BY PROPOSING THAT MINISTERS REQUEST THE NPG PERMREPS TO EXAMINE THE SUBJECT AND PROVIDE THEIR DETAILED RECOMMENDATIONS AT THE FALL NPG MINISTERIAL MEETING. US AUTHORITIES HAVE ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT NATO NEEDS IMPROVED DOCTRINE FOR THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS; THE NUNN AMENDMENT NUCLEAR REPORT ALSO CALLS ATTENTION TO DOCTRINE AS AN AREA WHERE IMPROVEMENTS ARE NEEDED. CONSEQUENTLY, THE APPROACH THAT THE UK IS PUSHING MAY PROVIDE A USEFUL VEHICLE FOR ACHIEVING US OBJECTIVES IN THIS AREA. AT THE SAME TIME, SUCH AN APPROACH WOULD INVOLVE THE ALLIES IN A DIFFICULT AND SENSITIVE UNDERTAKING WHICH WE BELIEVE WOULD REQUIRE VERY CAREFUL MANAGEMENT AND STRONG US PARTICIPATION. IN THIS CONNECTION, WE BELIEVE THE UK FORMULATION QUOTED ABOVE MERITS CLOSE SCRUTINY TO ENSURE THAT US OBJECTIVES WERE ADEQUATELY REPRESENTED.

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SENTED IF WE WISH TO PURSUE THIS APPROACH. IN ANY CASE, THE ISSUE IS NOW ON THE TABLE, AND MISSION NEEDS WASHINGTON GUIDANCE. ACTION REQUESTED: MISSION WOULD APPRECIATE WASHINGTON VIEWS, PRIOR TO MAY 2 IF POSSIBLE, ON THE UK PROPOSAL FOR PREPARATION OF AN OVERALL CONCEPT FOR USE OF THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES, AND ON THE QUESTION OF WHETHER PERMREPS SHOULD MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS ON THIS SUBJECT TO MINISTERS FOR THE JUNE NPG MEETING.

3. BEGIN TEXT OF REVISED DRAFT:

FOLLOW -ON USE WORK PROGRAMME-PHASE II
DRAFT REPORT BY THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES

I. PURPOSE

1. THIS REPORT IDENTIFIES, FOR MINISTERIAL DISCUSSION, A NUMBER OF POLICY ISSUES RELATED TO THE 'REPORT ON PHASE II OF THE WORK PROGRAMME ON FOLLOW-ON TACTICAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS'(1) AND MAKES SUGGESTIONS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PHASE III.

II. BACKGROUND

2. IN NOVEMBER 1969, THE NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP APPROVED THE 'PROVISIONAL POLITICAL GUIDELINES FOR THE INITIAL DEFENSIVE TACTICAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY NATO'(2) AS POLICY GUIDANCE FOR NATIONAL AUTHORITIES AND AS A DIRECTIVE TO NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES. AT THE SAME MEETING, MINISTERS RECOGNISED THE NEED FOR A STUDY OF FOLLOW-ON TACTICAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, TO EXAMINE THE PHASES OF TACTICAL USE SUBSEQUENT TO INITIAL USE BY NATO AND TO EXPLORE NATO RESPONSES TO AN INITIAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR TACTICAL PURPOSES BY THE WARSAW PACT. RATHER THAN ATTEMPT THIS TASK IN A SINGLE COMPREHENSIVE STUDY, THEY AGREED TO PROPOSALS PUT FORWARD BY THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES WHICH DEFINED(3) TO OBJECTIVES, GENERAL ASSUMPTIONS AND BROAD STRUCTURE OF AN OVERALL WORK PROGRAMME TO BE CARRIED OUT IN A SERIES OF INTERRELATED STEPS.

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(1) NPG/D(75)1; 27TH MARCH, 1975

BRACKET HEREAFTER REFERRED TO AS PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT.

END BRACKET

(2) NPG/D(69)7 OF 2ND OCTOBER, 1969, SUPERSEDED BY

DPC/D(69)58(REVISED) OF 10TH DECEMBER, 1970

(3) NPG/D(69)9(REVISED) OF 24TH NOVEMBER, 1969, ANNEX.

3. THE 'FOLLOW-ON USE WORK PROGRAMME' WAS DIVIDED INTO THREE MAJOR COMPONENTS:

(A) PHASE I (A SERIES OF INDIVIDUAL STUDIES TO EXAMINE IN DETAIL THE EFFECT OF THE VARIOUS FOLLOW-ON USE OPTIONS ON THE TACTICAL EVOLUTION OF SPECIFIC SITUATIONS);

(B) PHASE II (COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE PHASE I STUDIES, SYNTHESIS OF THEIR FINDINGS AND IDENTIFICATION OF THE POLICY QUESTIONS);

(C) PHASE III (FORMULATION OF PROPOSED POLITICAL GUIDELINES FOR FOLLOW-ON TACTICAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, FOR ENDORSEMENT BY THE NUCLEAR DEFENCE AFFAIRS COMMITTEE AND APPROVAL AND PROMULGATION BY SECRET

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THE DEFENCE PLANNING COMMITTEE(1).

4. PHASE I OF THE WORK PROGRAMME CAME TO A CONCLUSION IN MAY 1973, WITH MINISTERIAL CONSIDERATION OF THE LAST OF NINE STUDIES IN WHICH ALL NPG MEMBER NATIONS HAD PARTICIPATED, TOGETHER WITH THE NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES. FOLLOWING A DECISION(2) BY THE MINISTERS IN MAY 1972 TO INITIATE PHASE II AS SUGGESTED BY PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES(3), AN AD HOC STUDY TEAM COMPOSED OF PARTICIPANTS FROM THE UNITED STATES, THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY AND THE UNITED KINGDOM DEVELOPED A PHASE II REPORT. A PRELIMINARY

(1) NPG/D(71)7, 27TH JULY, 1971.

(2) NPG/D(72)7, 26TH MAY, 1972, PARAGRAPH 6

(3) NPG/D(72)5, 24TH APRIL, 1972.

VERSION OF THIS PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT WAS CIRCULATED AND WAS DISCUSSED BY THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES ON 20TH FEBRUARY, 1975.

IN THE LIGHT OF THESE DISCUSSIONS, AND WRITTEN COMMENTS RECEIVED FROM MEMBER NATIONS, THE STUDY TEAM THEN FINALISED ITS REPORT AND THERE IS GENERAL SATISFACTION WITH THE MANNER IN WHICH THIS HAS TAKEN ACCOUNT OF ALL CONTRIBUTIONS.

5. SINCE ITS INCEPTION, THE FOLLOW-ON USE WORK PROGRAMME HAS BEEN AN EXTREMELY IMPORTANT NPG WORK. (PHASE I: 1971-73; PHASE II: 1972-75.) ITS USEFULNESS IN CONNECTION WITH PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE WORK IN NATO IS EVIDENT. THE PROGRAMME HAS GENERATED OR REVIVED OTHER IMPORTANT ISSUES, SUCH AS STUDIES ON WARSAW PACT POLITICO-MILITARY STRATEGY AND MILITARY DOCTRINE(1) FOR THE TACTICAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND ON POLITICAL AND MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT CONCERNING TACTICAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS(2). PHASE III OF THE PROGRAMME WILL COINCIDE WITH WORK ON THE TECHNOLOGY STUDY AND FURTHER STUDIES IN THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL FIELD ON MATTERS RAISED IN CONNECTION WITH THE NUNN AMENDMENT. CAREFUL

CO-ORDINATION OF ALL THESE ISSUES WILL BE NECESSARY AND THIS IS DISCUSSED IN PART IV BELOW.

III. DISCUSSION

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CONCLUSIONS OF THE PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT

6. THE FUNDAMENTAL CONCLUSIONS OF THE PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT ARE(3):

(A) "FOLLOW-ON TACTICAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS DOES NOT PROVIDE A VIABLE ALTERNATIVE TO AN ADEQUATE ALLIANCE

(1) DPC/D(74)18, 5TH AUGUST, 1974

(2) NPG/D(74)3, 10TH AUGUST, 1974

(3) NPG/D(75)1, PARAGRAPH 81

CONVENTIONAL DEFENCE POSTURE. IN A SITUATION WHERE DETERRENCE HAD FAILED AND CONVENTIONAL DEFENCE FALTERED, THE BATTLEFIELD EFFECTIVENESS OF SUCH USE WOULD BE CRITICALLY DEPENDENT UPON ENEMY PERCEPTION OF NATO'S DEFENSIVE EFFORT AND HIS CONSEQUENT REACTION.

(B) "FOLLOW-ON USE COULD, HOWEVER, PROVIDE AN INVALUABLE OPPORTUNITY TO COMPEL THE ENEMY TO REASSESS THE RISK OF FURTHER ESCALATION UP TO AND INCLUDING THE STRATEGIC LEVEL AND SO CEASE HIS ATTACK AND WITHDRAW. AS IN INITIAL USE, THE PRIMARY REQUIREMENT WOULD BE FOR AN UNAMBIGUOUS AND CONVINCING SIGNAL, ALTHOUGH IN THE FOLLOW-ON PHASE THE ALLIANCE MIGHT NEED TO PROVIDE MORE ESCALATORY EVIDENCE OF ITS RESOLUTION.

(C) "ABOVE ALL, THE KNOWN POSSESSION OF SUCH WEAPONS AND THE EVIDENT ABILITY TO EXECUTE A WIDE RANGE OF OPTIONS FOR THEIR USE PLAYS A KEY ROLE IN ENSURING THE ALLIANCE DETERRENCE DOES NOT FAIL. THOUGH A SUBSTITUTE FOR NEITHER, IT CONSTITUTES A NECESSARY LINK BETWEEN THE ALLIANCE'S CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITIES AND ITS STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES./"

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7. WE BELIEVE THAT THE PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT PROVIDES A COMPREHENSIVE AND EFFECTIVE EVALUATION OF THE SUBJECT OF FOLLOW-ON USE WHICH MERITS CLOSE CONSIDERATION BY POLITICAL AND MILITARY AUTHORITIES. IN THE FOLLOWING DISCUSSION, WE DO NOT ATTEMPT TO COVER ALL OF THE FACETS OF THE SUBJECT WHICH ARE ADDRESSED IN THE REPORT. INSTEAD, WE HAVE SOUGHT TO HIGHLIGHT KEY ISSUES AND IMPLICATIONS WHICH HAVE SPECIAL RELEVANCE FOR NATO POLICY AND WHICH WE BELIEVE WILL BE OF PARTICULAR INTEREST TO MINISTERS.

8. THE FLOW OF OUR COMMENTS WILL FOLLOW THE PATTERN OF THE GENERAL CONCLUSIONS IN THE PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT, AS SET OUT IN PARAGRAPH 6 ABOVE. WE ARE AWARE AND WE APPRECIATE THAT THESE CONCLUSIONS SIMULTANEOUSLY REFLECT OPINIONS ON WHAT THE STUDY TEAM, IN THE FIRST PART OF ITS REPORT, HAD REFERRED TO AS THREE BASIC NEGATIVE ASSUMPTIONS WHICH COULD CAUSE NATO TO ARRIVE AT THE NECESSITY

FOR FOLLOW-ON USE(1): DETERRENCE FAILS, CONVENTIONAL DEFENCE MIGHT PROVE TO BE INADEQUATE AND INITIAL NUCLEAR USE DID NOT CONVINCE THE AGGRESSOR TO CEASE HIS ATTACK AND TO WITHDRAW.

CONVENTIONAL DEFENCE AND USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

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9. A BASIC STATEMENT IN THE PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT IS THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS CANNOT REPLACED CONVENTIONAL FORCES BUT THAT BOTH ARE COMPLEMENTARY(2). WE NOTE THAT THIS STATEMENT IS IN LINE

(1) PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT, PARAGRAPHS 18 AND 19.

(2) PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT, PARAGRAPH 75(A)

WITH NATO CURRENT PHILOSOPHY(1). IT IS CLEAR THAT COMPLEMENTATION IS MUTUAL. WHILE IT IS GENERALLY ACCEPTED THAT THE THEATRE NUCLEAR THREAT WOULD AFFECT ALL THEATER MILITARY OPERATIONS (I.E., INCLUDING STRICTLY CONVENTIONAL OPERATIONS), CONVENTIONAL FORCES

MUST BE ABLE TO EXPLOIT AND SUPPORT NUCLEAR OPERATIONS(2). THIS MIGHT AFFECT SCALE, LOCATION, TIMING, AND DURATION OF THE EMPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS NOTED BELOW. FURTHERMORE, IT IS OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT NATO'S SELECTIVE EMPLOYMENT PLANNING WOULD FACILITATE COMBINED CONVENTIONAL NUCLEAR DEFENCE. THE NECESSITY FOR ADEQUATE CONVENTIONAL FORCES TO COPE WITH ANY THREAT NATO MAY BE FORCED TO FACE HAS ALWAYS BEEN RECOGNISED. IT IS OBVIOUS TO US THAT WITHIN THE CONCEPT OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE, THE GREATER THE CAPABILITY OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES TO DEFEND AGAINST AN ATTACK, THE HIGHER THE THRESHOLD FOR THE TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. NPG WORK ON THE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS CONCERNING THE DEFENSIVE TACTICAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS MIGHT CONTRIBUTE A FURTHER KNOWLEDGE OR UNDERSTANDING OF THE NUCLEAR THRESHOLD.

(1) NPG/S(73)16, 8TH NOVEMBER, 1963, THE HAGUE AGREED MINUTE, PARAGRAPH 20.

(2) PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT, PARAGRAPH 75(C).

10. THE OTHER IMPORTANT AREA OF INTEREST OF THE PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT WITH REGARD TO CONVENTIONAL FORCES WAS THE IMBALANCE OF RAPIDLY AVAILABLE RESERVE FORMATIONS BETWEEN NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT. CONTROLLED AND LIMITED NUCLEAR EXCHANGE COULD LEAD TO SITUATIONS IN WHICH AVAILABLE REINFORCEMENTS MIGHT BECOME A DECISIVE FACTOR(1). FOR THIS REASON, AMONG OTHERS, WE CONCUR WITH THE STUDY TEAM'S CONCLUSION(2) THAT THE BATTLEFIELD EFFECTIVENESS OF FOLLOW-ON USE WOULD BE CRITICALLY DEPENDENT UPON ENEMY PRECEPTION OF
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NATO'S DEFENSIVE EFFORT. IT IS IN FURTHERANCE OF THIS GENERAL LINE OF REASONING AND BROAD UNDERSTANDING THAT WE ARE OFFERING THE COMMENTS WHICH FOLLOW.

(1) PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT, PARAGRAPH 39

(2) PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT, PARAGRAPH 81(A)

POLITICAL OBJECTIVES AND IMPLICATIONS OF FOLLOW-ON USE

11. POLITICAL OBJECTIVE AND SCALE OF USE. IF NATO'S INITIAL USE, WHATEVER ITS MAGNITUDE AND DURATION, FAILED TO INDUCE AN AGGRESSOR TO MAKE THE POLITICAL DECISION TO CEASE HIS ATTACK AND WITHDRAW, AND IF OTHER AVAILABLE POLITICAL SETPS WERE UNSUCCESSFUL IN ACHIEVING THIS OBJECTIVE, THE ALLIANCE WOULD HAVE TO TAKE FURTHER NUCLEAR USE INTO CONSIDERATION AS A MEANS TO CAUSE THE ENEMY TO CEASE HIS ATTACK. THE PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT CONCLUDES IN GENERAL(1) THAT IN THE FOLLOW-ON PHASE, NATO MIGHT NEED TO PROVIDE MORE ESCALATORY

EVIDENCE OF ITS RESOLUTION. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE REPORT NEITHER EXCLUDES SMALLER USE THAT IN THE INITIAL PHASE(2), NOR DOES IT DEFINE ANY UPPER LIMITS OF FOLLOW-ON USE(3). WE RECOGNISE THAT THE PHASE II STUDY TEAM RESTRAINT WITH REGARD TO ANY PRECISION ON SCALES OF USE

REFLECTS THE FACT THAT THE STUDY HAD BEEN DEVELOPED WITHIN THE GENERAL CONTEXT OF THE NATO AGREED STRATEGY OF FLEXIBILITY IN RESPONSE(4). IT IS NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT THE PRECEDING PHASE I STUDIES HAD FOCUSED ON MILITARY ASPECTS OF FOLLOW-ON USE IN RESTRICTED AREAS A FACT WHICH, TO SOME EXTENT, PREDETERMINED THE STUDY TEAM'S SYNTHESIS WITH REGARD TO SCALE OF USE.

12. GIVEN THE POLITICAL OBJECTIVE OF FOLLOW-ON USE (INDUCE THE ENEMY TO MAKE THE POLITICAL DECISION TO CEASE THE ATTACK AND WITHDRAW)

AND ALSO GIVEN THE FAILURE OF ACHIEVING THIS OBJECTIVE THROUGH INITIAL USE, FOLLOW-ON USE OF SMALLER SCALE THAN INITIAL

(1) PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT, PARAGRAPH 81(B)

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- (2) PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT, PARAGRAPH 67
- (3) PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT PARAGRAPH 74
- (4) PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT, PARAGRAPH 7

USE(1) MAY BE LESS CREDIBLE AND THEREFORE LESS SUCCESSFUL IN CONVINCING AN EMENY TO TERMINATE HIS ATTACK AS A RESULT OF NATO'S OVERALL HIGHER MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS. THE POSSIBILITY OF SELECTING PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE TARGETS WOULD CERTAINLY HAVE TO RECEIVE A HIGH DEGREE OF EVALUATION TO ENSURE THAT THE POLITICAL OBJECTIVE IS ACHIEVED.

13. ON THE OTHER HAND THE STUDY TEAM, IN THE CONTEXT OF SCALE OF USE, HAS ABSTAINED FROM DISCUSSING INTERRELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN WHAT THEY CALL "UPPER-LIMIT" THEATER OPTIONS(2) AND THE

POSSIBILITY OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR STRIKES ON SOVIET TERRITORY(3).
SELECTIVE OPTIONS UP TO A LIMIT WHERE DISTINCTION IS STILL POSSIBLE
FOR STRATEGIC EXCHANGE(4) COUPLED WITH LIMITED TARGETTING OPTIONS
FROM THE STRATEGIC ARSENAL (AL ALREADY DISCUSSED IN THE NPG) ARE
ESSENTIAL COMPONENTS OF NATO'S DETERRENT POSTURE. IT IS OUR
UNDERSTANDING THAT THE MAJOR NATO COMMANDERS ARE CURRENTLY IMPROV-
ING THEIR PLANNING BASE WITH RESPECT TO SELECTIVE EMPLOYMENT
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OPTIONS, THUS PROVIDING INCREASED FLEXIBILITY IN RESPONSE. WE
CONCLUDE THAT QUESTIONS RELATED TO FORMULATING GUIDANCE ON SCALE
OF USE WILL DESERVE HIGH ATTENTION IN PHASE III OF THIS WORK PROGRAMME.

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- (1) PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT, PARAGRAPH 67
 - (2) PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT, PARAGRAPH 74
 - (3) PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT, PARAGRAPH 8
 - (4) PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT, PARAGRAPH 74

14. POLITICAL OBJECTIVES AND MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS. THE
PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT RECOGNISES THE IMPORTANCE OF POLITICAL
OBJECTIVES IN RELATION TO MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS WHEN IT STATES
THAT(1) "THE CONSEQUENCES OF MILITARY ACTION HAVE TO BE CONSIDERED IN
RELATION NOT JUST TO SPECIFIC MILITARY GOALS BUT ABOVE ALL TO THE
ULTIMATE POLITICAL OBJECTIVE OF PRESUADING THE ENEMY TO CEASE HIS
AGGRESSION AND WITHDRAW." SINCE THIS IMPORTANCE IS A BASIC ELEMENT
GUIDING ANY DECISION TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS, IT MAY GIVE RISE TO A
NUMBER OF OTHER CONSIDERATIONS. IN MAKING THE CASE THAT THE
MILITARY OBJECTIVES OF FOLLOW-ON USE WILL IN ALMOST EVERY CASE BE
REVIEWED WITH REGARD TO NATO'S OVERALL POLITICAL GOAL, THE PHASE II
STUDY TEAM REPORT POINTS OUT(2) THAT FOLLOW-ON USE MUST BRING TO THE
ADVERSARY AN UNAMBIGUOUS AND CONVINCING SIGNAL OF THE RISK HE WILL
FACE IF HE DOES NOT CEASE HIS AGGRESSION. THE PHASE II STUDY TEAM
REPORT ALSO NOTES(3) THAT ALL FOLLOW-ON USES ARE LESS DISTINCT IN
THIS REGARD FROM EACH OTHER THAN FROM INITIAL USE. WE SHOULD LIKE
TO REITERATE OUR EARLIER COMMENT (PARAGRAPH 12 ABOVE) THAT SCALE
OF USE WOULD NOT BE THE ONLY VALID CRITERIA TO CONVINCE AN ENEMY
THAT CESSATION OF AGGRESSION WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO CONTINUATION.
ESCALATORY EVIDENCE COULD NOT ONLY BE DEMONSTRATED THROUGH SELECTION
OF TARGETS OF HIGH VALUE TO THE ENEMY BUT ALSO, AS INDICATED IN THE
PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT(4) EXTENSION OF STRIKES INTO THE DEPTH
OF ENEMY TERRITORY. TARGETS WHICH ARE PARTICULARLY VALUABLE IF LOOKED

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- (1) PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT, PARAGRAPHS 29 AND 74.
 - (2) PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT, PARAGRAPH 66, 79(B)
 - (3) PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT, PARAGRAPH 42
 - (4) PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT, PARAGRAPHS 45, 47, 48, 49,
70, 75(E), 79

AT UNDER THE PRESPECTIVE OF NATO'S POLITICAL OBJECTIVES, MIGHT BE,
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FOR EXAMPLE, ENEMY RESERVE FORMATIONS. WE NOTE IN THIS CONTEXT THE CONCERN ABOUT THESE FORCES REPEATEDLY EXPRESSED IN THE PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT(1).

15. POLITICAL OBJECTIVE AND USE IN EXTERNAL GEOGRAPHICAL AREAS. WHILE INITIAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS A MOST DISTINCTIVE STEP OF DELIBERATE ESCALATION (NOTWITHSTANDING LOCATION, MAGNITUDE OR DURATION), FOLLOW-ON USE MUST TAKE INTO ACCOUNT ONE OF THESE CRITERIA OR COMBINATIONS THEREOF. IF NATO SELECTS FOLLOW-ON USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO PROVIDE FURTHER EVIDENCE OF DETERMINATION TO ACHIEVE ITS POLITICAL OBJECTIVE AFTER THE FAILURE OF INITIAL USE, THE OPTION TO STRIKE IN AN EXTENDED GEOGRAPHICAL AREA COULD INTRODUCE A NEW ELEMENT OF DELIBERATE ESCALATION. WE NOTE THAT IN THE SUMMARY, THE PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT STATED(2) THAT THIS OPTION IS ONE OF THE BASIS ON WHICH THE CREDIBILITY OF NATO'S STRATEGY RESTS.

16. TIME FACTOR IN FOLLOW-ON USE. THE PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT STATES THAT THE TIMING FOR FOLLOW-ON USE WOULD DEPEND UPON A COMBINATION OF MILITARY AND POLITICAL OBJECTIVES WHICH ARE ULTIMATELY INSEPARABLE(3). IT RECOGNISES THAT, IN THIS RESPECT ALSO, POLITICAL OBJECTIVES MIGHT, IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES, BE IN CONFLICT WITH A MILITARY INTEREST FOR AN EARLY FOLLOW-ON USE, AND THAT SINCE ACTUAL SITUATIONS CANNOT BE PRE-DETERMINED WITH THE NECESSARY PRECISION(4), ONLY VERY GENERAL GUIDANCE COULD BE GIVEN IN ADVANCE. SUCH GUIDANCE COULD INCLUDE CONSIDERATION OF A NUMBER OF FACTORS SUCH AS:

(1) PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT, PARAGRAPH 25(C), 27, 63, 73

(2) PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT, PARAGRAPH 79

(3) PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT, PARAGRAPH 44

(4) PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT, PARAGRAPH 42

(A) THE RELATIONSHIP IN TIME BETWEEN INITIAL AND FOLLOW-ON USE;

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(B) THE AGREED PRINCIPLE THAT THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS SHOULD NOT TAKE PLACE SO LATE THAT NATO CONVENTIONAL FORCES HAD BEEN ALREADY EXHAUSTED AND WOULD THEREFORE NO LONGER BE IN A POSITION TO EXPLOIT THE EFFECTS OF THE USE OF OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS;

(C) THE NEED FOR GIVING THE ENEMY THE TIME TO PRECEIVE NATO POLITICAL AIMS BALANCED WITH POSSIBLE MILITARY DISADVANTAGES OF DELIBERATELY INTRODUCING DELAYS BETWEEN SUCCESSIVE NUCLEAR OPERATIONS(1);

(D) THE NECESSITY OF PRESERVING MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS BY TIMELY USE IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE TARGETS OF FLEETING NATURE ARE TO BE ATTACKED;

(E) FOLLOW-ON USE IN ONE AREA DIFFERENT FROM THAT WHERE INITIAL USE TOOK PLACE.

COLLATERAL DAMAGE

17. THE ATTENTION PAID BY PHASE I STUDIES TO COLLATERAL SECRET

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DAMAGE, IN PARTICULAR CIVILIAN CASUALTIES, IS REFLECTED IN THE PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT(2) WHICH WEANS THAT CIVILIAN CASUALTY DATA MUST BE TREATED AS PROVIDING ORDERS OF MAGNITUDE RATHER THAN PRECISE FIGURES IN VIEW OF THE HYPOTHETICAL AND ILLUSTRATIVE NATURE OF THE STUDIES

(1) PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT, PARAGRAPH 44

(2) PHASE II STUDY REAM REPORT, PARAGRAPHS 34 THROUGH 37, AND 75(B)

AND THEIR ASSUMPTIONS. THE REPORT ALSO MENTIONS VARIOUS TECHNIQUES ALREADY AVAILABLE TO NATO COMMANDERS TO MINIMISE COLLATERAL DAMAGE(1) USED IN SOME PHASE I STUDIES. IN THIS CONTEXT, WE AGAIN RECALL THE NPG STUDY NOW UNDERWAY(2) ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS, THE RESULTS OF WHICH MAY POINT TO IMPROVED POSSIBILITIES TO REDUCE AND CONTROL COLLATERAL DAMAGE.

FOLLOW-ON USE AND NATO STRATEGY

18M THE PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT DESCRIBES(3) THE PLACE OF FOLLOW-ON USE IN NATO STRATEGY. TO FACILITATE MINISTERIAL DISC-

USION OF THIS SUBJECT IN THE LIGHT OF OUR EARLIER OBSERVATIONS, WE WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS SOME FURTHER POLICY QUESTIONS WHICH MIGHT BECOME RELEVANT IN CONNECTION WITH THE FUTURE TASK OF PHASE III OF THE FOLLOW-ON USE WORK PROGRAMME.

19. DURING FORMER NPG MINISTERIAL DISCUSSIONS ON IMPLICATIONS OF NATO STRATEGY, THE GREAT IMPORTANCE OF THEATRE NUCLEAR ALONG WITH THAT OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES, IN THE ERA OF STRATEGIC EQUIVALENCE HAS BEEN RECOGNISED. THE PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT HAS LIKEWISE CONCLUDED(4) THAT THE TACTICAL NUCLEAR USE OPTION IN PARTICULAR IS A CARDINAL COMPONENT IN NATO'S WHOLE STRATEGY OF DETERRENCE AND FLEXIBILITY IN RESPONSE. FURTHERMORE, IT IS EVIDENT THAT THE BASIC NATO MILITARY STRATEGY PAPER, MC 14/3, PROVIDES THE ALLIANCE WITH SUFFICIENT CONCEPTUAL FLEXIBILITY IN SO FAR AS OPTIONS WITH REGARD TO ALL FORMS OF NATO REACTION ARE CONCERNED.

(1) PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT, PARAGRAPH 75(B)

(2) NPG/D(74)3

(3) PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT, PARAGRAPHS 7-14, 78-80

(4) PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT, PARAGRAPH 80

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20. WHILE IT IS CLEAR THAT POLITICAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS STRATEGY WOULD HAVE TO BE CAREFULLY EVALUATED WHEN THE SITUATION ARISES, IT IS ALSO INDISPENSABLE THAT THE RESPONSE BE SUCH THAT NATO'S OVERALL OBJECTIVE (THE PRESERVATION OR RESTORATION OF THE INTEGRITY AND SECURITY OF THE NATO AREA) IS ACHIEVED. FLEXIBILITY THUS REFERS TO THE DEGREE OF SELECTIVITY IN THE FORMS OF NATO REACTIONS AS WELL AS TO THE RELATED PROCESS THROUGH WHICH SUCH REACTIONS ARE IMPLEMENTED. IT NOT ONLY REQUIRES THAT ACTUAL ABILITY TO COPE WITH VARIOUS MILITARY TYPES OF AGGRESSION, BUT ALSO IMPLIES THAT NATO HAS THE RESOLVE TO APPLY THE VARIOUS DEGREE OF MILITARY POWER DURING CRISES. SUCH A STRATEGY, IN EMPHASISING FORWARD DEFENCE, THEREFORE ENCOMPASSES A DENIAL MILITARY CONCEPT AS WELL AS THE POLITICAL NECESSITY TO IMPLEMENT THIS STRATEGY IN A CRISIS MANAGEMENT MODE(1) DESIGNED TO TERMINATE THE HOSTILITIES AT THE LOWEST LEVEL POSSIBLE CONSISTENT WITH ACHIEVING NATO'S OBJECTIVES.

21. WITH RESPECT TO THE EMPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, IMPLEMENTATION OF NATO'S STRATEGY IN A GIVEN SITUATION, ACCORDING TO THE PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT, WOULD MOST LIKELY START FROM THE EXPECTATION(2) THAT WARSAW PACT ATTACKS ON BALANCE WOULD MOST LIKELY TO BE NON-NUCLEAR INITIALLY AND THAT SOVIET LEADERS, RECOGNISING THE CONSEQUENCES OF GENERAL WAR, ARE HIGHLY UNLIKELY DELIBERATELY TO ESCALATE LIMITED CONFLICTS. THIS SUPPORTS CAUTION-NESS TO BE A GUIDING FACTOR IN NUCLEAR EMPLOYMENT POLICY WHICH IS ALSO CLEARLY DEMONSTRATED BY THE NPG'S POLITICAL APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM. PHASING BETWEEN INITIAL AND FOLLOW-ON USE (AND CERTAINLY

- (1) PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT, PARAGRAPHS 77, 78
MC 14/3 (FINAL), 16TH JANUARY 1968, PARAGRAPH 17A AND B, 22C.
(2) PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT, PARAGRAPH 19.

NOT EXCLUDING FURTHER PHASING WITHIN FOLLOW-ON USE) IS ONE CONSEQUENCE OF NATO'S STRATEGY OF FLEXIBILITY IN RESPONSE. BOTH IN MILITARY AND POLITICAL TERMS, A CONCEPT OF GRADUATED SUCCESSIVE LOW-SCALE FOLLOW-ON USES COULD BE CHALLENGED MILITARILY, BECAUSE OF THE PROBABLE LIMITED RESULTS AND POLITICALLY, BECAUSE SUCH FORMS OF PHASING MAY VERY WELL BE INTERPRETED BY THE ADVERSARY AS A DEMONSTRATION OF NATO'S UNWILLINGNESS OR LACK OF RESOLVE
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TO ESCALATE. ALTERNATIVELY, THE POLITICAL CHOICE MIGHT LEAN TO A RELAXATION OF CONSTRAINTS SO AS TO GIVE CLEAR AND STRONG EVIDENCE OF THE ALLIANCES RESOLVE DELIBERATELY TO ESCALATE TO MORE PUNITIVE OPTIONS IF THE PURPOSE OF HALTING THE ATTACK IS NOT INTENDED. WE SHOULD LIKE TO SUPPORT THE STUDY TEAMS EMPHASIS(1) THAT THIS ALTERNATIVE IS ALSO COMPATIBLE WITH NATO'S STRATEGY OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE AND THE CONCEPT OF POLITICAL CRISIS MANAGEMENT REFERRED TO ABOVE.

22. SUMMARY. WE CONCLUDE THAT MORE ESCALATORY EVIDENCE, IF NEEDED TO SIGNAL NATO'S RESOLVE TO CONTINUE WITH NUCLEAR DEFENCE MEASURES COULD BE ACHIEVED THROUGH SUCH DIFFERENT FACTORS AS MAGNITUDE, LOCATION AND TIME OR DURATION OF A FOLLOW-ON USE OR ANY COMBINATION OF THESE. SINCE POLITICAL GUIDANCE FOR FOLLOW-ON USE (PHASE III) WOULD HAVE TO CONCENTRATE, AMONG OTHER MATTERS AND IN CONNECTION WITH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ADOPTED NATO STRATEGY, TO PROVIDE MORE ESCALATORY EVIDENCE, WE CONSIDER THAT DETAILED TREATMENT OF THIS CRITICAL ELEMENT IN THE PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT AS MOST USEFUL.

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(1) PHASE II STUDY REAM REPORT, PARAGRAPH 79.

QV. FOLLOW-ON USE WORK PROGRAMME - INITIATION OF PHASE III

23. FROM ITS INCEPTION, THE NPG DEVOTED GREATEST ATTENTION TO THE PROBLEMS RELATED TO THE NECESSITY FOR NATO, IF ATTACKED TO INITIATE DEFENSIVE TACTICAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE MAIN EFFORT WAS FOCUSSED ON SUCH MATTERS AS POLITICAL GUIDELINES FOR INITIAL DEFENSIVE TACTICAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS(1), CONSULTATION PROCEDURES(2), GUIDELINES FOR THE USE OF ADM'S(3) AND THE ROLE OF THEATRE STRIKE FORCES(4). THIS EFFORT, ALONG WITH THE CONSIDERATION OF A NUMBER OF RELATED ISSUES LED TO THE CONVICTION THAT A DEEPER AND MORE COMPREHENSIVE POLITICAL ANALYSIS FOR THEATRE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE CONTEXT OF NATO'S STRATEGY OF FLEXIBILITY IN RESPONSE, ADOPTED BY NATO IN DECEMBER 1967, WOULD BE DESIRABLE. IT MIGHT BE ARGUED THAT SUCH AN OVERALL POLICY WOULD, AMONG OTHER MATTERS, HAVE TO INCLUDE CONSIDERATION OF:

- ASSURED MEANS FOR POLITICAL CONSULTATION;
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- POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS AND RELATED PROCEDURES FOR
NUCLEAR WEAPONS' USE;

- INTERRELATIONSHIPS WITH NATO'S OTHER NUCLEAR AS WELL
AS CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITIES; AND

- THE STOCKPILE NEEDED FOR VARIOUS CONTINGENCIES.

WE SUGGEST THAT THE MINISTERS, IN CONSIDERATION ALSO OF THE ISSUES RAISED IN CONNECTION WITH THE NUNN AMENDMENT, THE ONGOING TECHNOLOGY STUDY AND THE PHASE II REPORT ITSELF, DISCUSS THE POSSIBLE REQUIREMENT FOR THE NPG TO FURTHER DEFINE, IN CLOSE

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- (1) PROVISIONAL POLITICAL GUIDELINES FOR THE INITIAL DEFENSIVE TACTICAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY NATO (DPC/D(69)58(REVISED), 10TH DECEMBER, 1970).
 - (2) GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR CONSULTATION PROCEDURES ON THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (DPC/D(60)59, 20TH NOVEMBER 1969)
 - (3) SPECIAL POLITICAL GUIDELINES FOR THE POSSIBLE USE OF ATOMIC DEMOLITION MUNITIONS (DPC/D(70)60, 10TH DECEMBER 1970)
 - (4) CONCEPT FOR THE ROLE OF THEATRE NUCLEAR STRIKE FORCES IN ACE (DPC/D(70)59 (REVISED), 21ST DECEMBER 1972.

CO-OPERATION WITH THE NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES, THE OVERALL POLICY FOR THEATRE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE US SECRETARY OF DEFENCE REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURE IN EUROPE(1) AS CIRCULATED IN THE NPG COULD PROVIDE A BASIS FOR SUCH AN EFFORT.

24. WITH NPG MINISTERS HAVING CONSIDERED THE PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT AND THIS RELATED NPG PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES' REPORT, THE QUESTION OF THE SCOPE, PURPOSE AND TIMING OF PHASE III OF THE FOLLOW-ON USE WORK PROGRAMME REQUIRES MINISTERS' ATTENTION AND DIRECTION. THE PHASE III TASK, AS ENVISAGED BY THE NPG MINISTERS IN 1971(2) WAS THE FORMULATION OF POLICY GUIDANCE." THE MINISTERS DID NOT, AT THAT TIME, ATTEMPT TO PROVIDE SPECIFIC TERMS OF REFERENCE TO GUIDE THE PHASE III EFFORT IN ADVANCE OF THE IDENTIFICATION OF POLICY QUESTIONS(3) FLOWING FROM THE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND SYNTHESIS OF FINDINGS DURING PHASE II. HOW, HOWEVER, ON THE BASIS OF THE WORK DONE IN PHASES I AND II, THE PROCESS OF FORMULATION OF POLICY GUIDANCE COULD BE INITIATED.

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25. IN EXAMINING HOW PHASE III COULD BE UNDERTAKEN, THREE POSSIBLE APPROACHES WERE CONSIDERED:

(A) APPROACH 1: DEVELOP A NEW DOCUMENT, PROVISIONAL POLITICAL GUIDELINES FOR FOLLOW-ON TACTICAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY NATO SEPARATE, BUT PARALLEL, TO THE EXISTING PROVISIONAL POLITICAL GUIDELINES FOR THE INITIAL DEFENSIVE TACTICAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY NATO (PPG).

(1) BRU-NSA-75-5, 1ST APRIL, 1975

(2) DPG/D(71)7, 27TH JULY, 1971, PARAGRAPHS 9 AND 21

(3) NPG/D(71)7, PARAGRAPH 17.

(B) APPROACH 2: UPDATE, REVISE AND EXPAND AS NECESSARY, THE EXISTING PPG USING ALL APPROPRIATE DATA GATHERED SINCE THE INCEPTION OF THE FOLLOW-ON USE WORK PROGRAMME AND PUBLISH A NEW DOCUMENT ENTITLED "POLITICAL GUIDELINES FOR THE TACTICAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY NATO" TO SUPPLANT THE CURRENT PPG.

(C) APPROACH 3: TAKING INTO ACCOUNT OTHER NPG ON-GOING WORK (TECHNOLOGY STUDY, NUNN AMENDMENT FOLLOW-UP, MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE), IDENTIFY AND BRING TOGETHER ALL THE BASIC POLICY DOCUMENTS AND DEVELOP A COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT FOR NATO'S USE OF THEATRE NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

IN VIEW OF THE IMPORTANCE AND COMPLEXITY OF THE WORK TO BE UNDERTAKEN IN FULFILMENT OF PHASE III, MINISTERS MAY WISH TO REQUEST THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES TO CONDUCT A CAREFUL AND DETAILED EXAMINATION HOW PHASE III COULD BE UNDERTAKEN AND TO PROVIDE RECOMMENDATIONS TO MINISTERS AT THEIR NEXT MEETING.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS

26. THE MINISTERS MAY WISH TO:

- TAKE NOTE OF THE PHASE II STUDY TEAM REPORT;

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- DRAW, INTER ALIA, ON THE FOREGOING PARAGRAPHS IN
PART III FOR THEIR DISCUSSION;

- DISCUSS MATTERS RAISED IN THE FOREGOING PARAGRAPHS
IN PART IV;

- INVITE THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES TO CONDUCT
AN EXAMINATION HOW PHASE III COULD BE UNDERTAKEN.

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